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RECENT CASES
Justice Douglas urged that Brown v. Walker be overruled. He demon-
strated little patience with any ruling which followed Brown v. Walker
because "it is an old and established decision",24 and denied that
Brown v. Walker had any greater claim to sanctity than the "other
venerable decisions which history showed had outlived their useful-
ness or were conceived in error".25
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in this well-considered opinion has resolved
the confusion which has stemmed from a multitude of decisions regard-
ing the grant of immunity to witnesses in lieu of their Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court considered this privi-
lege to be one so fundamental and important as to be "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."2 6 At the same
time, the Court recognized the compelling need for successful Con-
gressional investigation as a means of insuring national security and
arrived at a decision which, despite the hardships sometimes resulting
from a compulsion of testimony pointed out by Douglas, J.,2 7 was a
just and desirable one.
Charles L. Calk
ESTATE TAXATioN-MARITAL DFuucnoN-PowER oF Apponmrmuvr
TmumNABLE UPON WniE's INcAPAcrr-Frank E. Tingley, a resident of
Rhode Island, left part of his residuary estate in trust for his wife for
life with a general power to invade corpus. The trust instrument pro-
vided that in the event of the wife's incapacity or the appointment of
a guardian, her power to invade corpus was to cease.' The Tax Court
held that the trust corpus did not qualify for the marital deduction.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
24 Id. at 455.
25 Ibid.26 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend, 40 A.B.A.J.
502, 503 (1954). Cited by the Court in the principal case at 350 U.S. 422, 426.2 7 For a further discussion of the undesirable aspects of the granting of im-
munity, see King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J.
377 (1954).
1 The trust instrument also provided that upon incapacity or appointment of
a guardian the wife's right to income was to cease. Under local law, without the
terminating conditions of the instrument, the wife would be entitled to the income
for life, regardless of her capacity. Therefore, the wife's rights are substantially
less under the terms of the instrument than under local law. If the court had
based its decision upon this provision in the trust instrument the decision reached
by the court would be justified. But the court said, and counsel for both parties
agreed, that the only issue to be decided was whether the widow's power to in-
vade corpus was exerciseable by her "alone and in all events."
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Starrett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 223 F. 2d 163 (CA1
1955). The Internal Revenue Code sec. 2056 (b) (5) provides that
property devised to a spouse in trust for life with a power of appoint-
ment qualifies for the marital deduction if the power of appointment3
"is exerciseable by such spouse alone and in all events." The sole issue
to be determined in this case was whether the widow's power to in-
vade the corpus, which is equivalent to a power of appointment, was
exerciseable by her "alone and in all events." 4 The Court held that
the power to invade corpus was not exerciseable "in all events" be-
cause it was to terminate upon her legal incapacity or the appointment
of a guardian.
It was the petitioner's contention that the testamentary limitations-
incapacity or the appointment of a guardian-on the surviving spouse's
power did not add substantially to the limitation on the power pro-
vided under local law, and therefore should be disregarded on the im-
plication that Congress, in requiring that the power must be exercise-
able "in all events", did not mean to deny the marital deduction where
the terminating condition was by local law. The Circuit Court said,
however, that under the law of Rhode Island, upon incapacity or
appointment of a guardian, the power of appointment would be sus-
pended during the period of disability, however long or short it might
be; whereas under the terms of the trust the power of appointment
ceases permanently upon that event. "Hence," the court concluded,
"the terms of the will impose a significant condition in addition to that
which would be supplied by the applicable state law."5
The purpose of the marital deduction was to equalize tax ad-
vantages in the common law and the community property states, and
to permit the surviving spouse in the common law state to take a por-
tion of the deceased spouse's estate free of the burden of federal estate
taxes. 6 In a community property state the husband has control of the
property during his life, but upon his death his surviving spouse gets
absolute ownership in one-half of all the community property and
only one-half of the property is includible in the deceased spouse's
2 Bittker, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 1019 (1955). In general,
there is allowed as a deduction from the gross estate an amount equal to the
value of property passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but such
deduction cannot exceed one-half of the estate.
3 Power of appointment is defined in 1954 Internal Revenue Code see. 2041
(5) as being a power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest in her
favor or in favor of her estate.
4 See note 1, supra.
5 Id., 223 F 2d at 167.
6 Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F 2d 486 (CA4 1955). California Trust Co. v. Rid-
dell, 136 F Supp. 7 (D Cal. 1955). Weyenberg v. U.S., 135 F Supp. 299 (ED
Wis. 1955).
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estate for estate tax purposes. If a husband in a common law state
gives his wife the same control over the property as the wife has in a
community property state, i.e., absolute ownership or its equivalent,
then the estate tax consequences are the same. Therefore, the under-
lying problem in the case at hand is whether Mrs. Tingley had, under
the terms of the trust instrument, the equivalent of absolute ownership.
In answering this question in the negative the court not only lost
sight of the purpose of the marital deduction as stated above, but it
resorted to strained reasoning in disallowing the deduction by drawing
a distinction between "suspension" of the power under local law and
"cessation" of the power under the terms of the trust instrument. It is
true that under local law if Mrs. Tingley became incapacitated her
power to invade the corpus would be suspended during the period of
disability and, should she recover, her power to invade corpus would
be restored; whereas under the terms of the trust instrument her power
to invade corpus ceased absolutely and forever. But even so, Mrs.
Tingley's rights of ownership are not substantially lessened by the
terminating conditions of the instrument since, even if Mrs. Tingley
did become incapacitated, the possibility that she would recover her
sanity and be capable of exercising the power again is negligible. Her
control over the corpus is exactly the same as she would have were the
terminating provisions omitted, unless she becomes insane and re-
covers. To say that this possibility made her rights substantially less
is to remove the decision of the court from the realm of practicality
and to deny rights because of remote possibilities. Taxation ought to
be, as Justice Douglas once said it was, "eminently a practical matter."
There seems to be no good reason for allowing a near impossibility
to defeat the marital deduction if the spouse receives the practical
equivalent of absolute ownership and, in allowing the deduction, there
would be no clear means of tax avoidance. If the deduction had been
allowed here, would there have been any way for the corpus to escape
gift or estate taxation in the hands of the wife? The only way the
widow could avoid the estate tax on the untaxed portion of the corpus
would be for her to consume the corpus during her life, but this chance
is taken in every case where the marital deduction is allowed. Of
course, the widow might give the entire corpus away, but in such case
she would have to pay a gift tax.8 There is also the chance that the
widow might become incapacitated before exercising the power of
appointment. Under local law, without the terminating conditions of
7 Fernandez v. Weiner, 826 U.S. 340, 865 (1945).8 1954 Int. Rev. Code, see. 2511.
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the instrument, the existence of the "suspended" power of appointment
would nevertheless cause the corpus to be included in her estate.9
However, under the terms of the trust instrument, incapacity would
cause Mrs. Tingley's power of appointment to cease forever. No
cases have been found to support the view that the corpus would be
included in her estate, but it would seem that upon her incapacity the
termination of the power of appointment would either be treated as a
release or as a lapse and the corpus subjected to the gift tax. It might
well be treated as a release of the power since the remainder over is
no longer subject to divestment by exercise of the power, and an
effective transfer of the property would be made. In such case a gift
tax would be payable.10 If we do not treat the power as released upon
incapacity it would have to be treated as a lapse. A lapse has been
defined as the "termination or failure of a right or privilege through
neglect to exercise it within some limit of time, or through failure of
some contingency."" If the termination of the power were treated as
a lapse, a gift tax would be payable on all but $5,000 or 5% of the
corpus.' 2 Therefore, if the cessation of the power of appointment were
treated as a release of the power there would be no tax avoidance
whatsoever; and if treated as a lapse only $5,000 or 5% of the corpus
would escape the gift tax. Thus there seems to be no possible loop-
hole for tax avoidance, except that a small portion of the corpus might
escape taxation if Mrs. Tingley became incapacitated and if the termi-
nation of the power is treated as a lapse rather than as a release.
If the courts fail to be practical in determining whether the sur-
viving spouse has less rights under trust instruments and wills than
under state law, they may well end up rendering decisions as unex-
pected and unjust as some they have reached in applying the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 13 which voids an interest if there is any possi-
bility-however remote-that it will not vest within lives in being plus
21 years. Whatever can be said for judging the validity of future
interests by possibilities rather than probabilities, no sound policy is
served by turning tax liability upon extremely remote possibilities.
Equal protection of the law demands that taxpayers who have sub-
stantially the same rights have the same tax liability. If the surviving
spouse's rights under state law as the donee of a power of appointment
9 C. C. H. Letter Ruling, sec. 8044. Hurd v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 160 F 2d 610 (CCA1 1947). I. R. C., sec. 2041.10 1954 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 2514 (2)(b).
"1 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 15 A. 2d 830, 834 (1940).
12 1954 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 2514 (e).
.3 For a discussion of a few of these cases see 51 Harvard L. R. 638, 642-46
(1938).
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are not substantially lessened by restrictions on the power written in
the trust instrument, and if by allowing the deduction the trust corpus
cannot escape estate or gift taxation in her hands, then the marital
deduction should be allowed.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
MAsTim AND SEvANT-Luminrr OF MASTER FOR SANcnoN D HoRsE-
PLAY OF SEnvNr-Appellant had put his servant, the co-defendant, in
charge of the restaurant of which he was the owner and operator.
While the servant was in charge, he sprayed or poured inflammable
fluid used in cigarette lighters on the shirt of the plaintiff who had
dozed off at the counter. The plaintiff's shirt was set afire and he suf-
fered severe injuries as a result of the prank. Although the appellant
was not present at the time, he had in the past observed such horse-
play by his servant and had even engaged in it himself. He stated that
this was the first time any injury had occurred as a result. The trial
jury found in favor of the plaintiff and returned a verdict of $1,274.50
damages, with the provision that the appellant, proprietor, should pay
$1,200.00 of that amount. Held: affirmed. Where the proprietor of a
restaurant had observed and sanctioned horseplay of his servant and
knew or should have known that such horseplay might result in injury
to a patron, he is liable for injuries suffered by a patron as a result of
similar horseplay engaged in by his servant during his absence. This
was said by the Court to follow from the rule that when an employer
leaves one in charge of his business during his absence and that one
wrongfully does something to injure a patron, which the employer has
reason to know he may do, the employer is liable therefor. Baldwin v.
1Wiggins, 289 S.W. 2d 729 Ky. 1956).
The theory relied upon by the Court in establishing the employer's
liability is somewhat difficult to determine. If the Court means to say
that an employer is liable for anything his employee may do when he
leaves his employee in charge of his store, this is a striking new imposi-
tion of responsibility upon storeowners. Such blanket liability is not
grounded in agency. If, however, the Court means to impose such
responsibility only where the employer knew or had reason to know
of the dangerous acts of the employee, then the theory of the em-
ployer's liability is either his own independent negligence in not for-
bidding the dangerous acts or the application of. what appears to be a
new test to determine when a servant's act is within the scope of his
employment.
It is a well established principle that a master is responsible for the
